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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show how housing tenure (rented vs. owner-occupied) a¤ects monetary
policy. I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing, both owned and
rented. First, I analyze how, in the model, preference parameters, scal incentives, and institutional
factors determine the rental market share and the residential debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, within this
framework, I study how the transmission and optimality of monetary policy di¤er depending on
these factors. From a positive perspective, impulse responses illustrate di¤erences in the monetary
transmission mechanism. I nd that of all factors, tax incentives generate the largest di¤erences. In
normative terms, results show that when the relative size of the rental market is larger, monetary
policy is more stabilizing. An optimal monetary policy analysis also suggests that in this case,
monetary policy should respond more aggressively to ination and disregard output, because the
nancial accelerator e¤ects are weaker.
Keywords: Housing market, rental, owner-occupied housing, monetary policy
JEL: E21, E3, E51, E6
The author would like to thank seminar participants at the University of Nottingham, the National Bank of Poland,
Michal Rubaszek, and Jose A. Carrasco-Gallego for their very useful comments. This paper was presented at the National
Bank of Poland Conference, The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Diverse Economies,2013, the CGBCR Conference
at the University of Manchester, the MMF, the XXII Encuentro de Economía Pública, SNDE 2015, and the 11th Dynare
Conference. Special thanks to José E. Boscá for serving as a discussant and giving excellent comments. Part of this
project was undertaken when the author was visiting the National Bank of Poland. She would like to thank them for their
hospitality. All errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
Housing market structure shows remarkable cross-country di¤erences. In particular, these divergences
are especially important in terms of the relative weight, e¢ ciency, and dynamics of the rental sector.
The proportion of households that rent ranges from less than 10% in some Eastern European countries,
to more than 50% in Switzerland, Japan, and Germany (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Within
the European Union, Germany and Spain are notable for having the highest and lowest rental ratios,
respectively. For example, in 2008, while the rental share in Europe was 33.2% on average, it was 15.5%
in Spain and 56.8% in Germany.
This heterogeneity, which may be due to several factors, including cultural preferences, taxation,
development of the rental market, demographics, and institutional e¢ ciency, among others, can have a
signicant e¤ect on the transmission of di¤erent economic shocks and on the conduct of monetary policy.
Therefore, it is a relevant topic of study.
First, the relative weight of the rental market can be a consequence of di¤erent household preferences
or cultural factors. For example, in southern Europe, children tend to live with their parents for a
longer period and, therefore, enter the residential property market relatively late. Furthermore, they are
frequently nancially supported by their parents, and even receive their property from them [see Earley
(2004)]. There are also cultural attitudes to property that have an impact on the relative importance of
the di¤erent forms of housing tenure. For example, for some consumers, owner-occupation is a symbol of
social status or it implies the possibility of bequests that can be a life objective by itself. Di¤erences in
the prevalence of these motives contribute to explaining the divergences in cross-country housing tenure
regimes.
Institutional factors around the housing market represent another important source of heterogeneity
across countries in terms of the relative size of the rental market. Apart from specic market regulation,
the functioning of the legal system has a direct e¤ect on its e¢ ciency [Mora-Sanguinetti (2011) o¤ers a
detailed analysis of these elements for di¤erent European countries]. Given the evidence of cross-country
di¤erences in the capacity of the legal system to enforce contracts, Casas-Arce and Saiz (2010) analyze
this topic with an international sample and estimate that the less e¢ cient the legal system, the lower is
the rental market share in the economy. Figure A2 and Table A1 in the Appendix show that legal system
di¤erences across countries could a¤ect the e¢ ciency and functioning of rental markets, and ultimately
their size.
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On the other hand, tax incentives for owner-occupied home purchase reduce the proportion of rental
housing. In the same way, scal deductions associated with mortgage interest payments also increase
home purchases. Fiscal incentives to the rental sector would increase the relative size of this market.
Figure A3 in the Appendix shows some di¤erences in taxation across countries. In the majority of
the OECD countries, governments have tended to give incentives to home purchases, through favorable
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. This policy orientation mainly through scal benets to
home purchasers has been common in many countries. However, there have recently been some other
initiatives to promote rental housing, given that an underdeveloped rental sector has been considered to
be harmful to the economy.
It is also remarkable that housing is treated as a mechanism to generate wealth. In many countries,
access to credit markets requires a housing collateral and it implies a mortgage equity withdrawal.
In those countries in which this practice exists, owning a house has an additional benet that can
positively a¤ect the propensity of households to purchase houses. The size of the rental market then has
implications for the size of nancial accelerator e¤ects and for the transmission of monetary policy. These
nancial accelerator e¤ects will depend on the relative proportion of owners and renters. Therefore, at
the macroeconomic level, these e¤ects may be larger the greater is the importance of property in the
economy, because the macroeconomy will be more sensitive to changes in house prices. In other words,
the nancial accelerator caused by collateral e¤ects will be stronger in this case and monetary policy
will potentially have larger e¤ects on the economy.
This paper is related to the literature concerning cross-country di¤erences with respect to housing
tenure. In particular, there are three types of studies. On the one hand, there are papers that compare
rental market characteristics in di¤erent countries and obtain conclusions about the importance of these
features for the relative incidence of owners and renters [Pomeroy and Godbout (2011), Earley (2004),
among others]. A second group of studies analyses the relationship between housing tenure regime and
di¤erent economic variables, using microeconometric techniques with panel or cross-section data for
di¤erent countries, especially the OECD [see, for example, Andrews and Caldera (2011) or Casas-Arce
and Saiz (2010)]. Finally, there are also studies that analyze the macroeconomic implications of the
rental market relative size in a general equilibrium context [see, for example, Ortega et al. (2011) and
Mora-Sanguinetti and Rubio (2014), for the Spanish economy].1 This paper is closest to the latter set
1Alpanda and Zubairy (2013) also consider a DSGE model with rental market to study the e¤ects of tax policy on the
macroeconomy, albeit abstracting from monetary policy.
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of studies.
The contribution of this paper is that I study how di¤erences in housing tenure a¤ect monetary
policy, something novel in the literature. I propose a general equilibrium model that is able to capture
these di¤erences in housing tenure across countries. The modeling strategy and its calibration aims
at providing a general framework to study these issues, without having any specic economy in mind.
Financial accelerator e¤ects of owner-occupied housing are taken into account through the introduction
of collateral constraints on borrowers. Cultural, institutional and preference factors are included in the
utility function of agents. Housing-related taxation appears explicitly through home purchase and rental
subsidies. Through model simulations, I analyze how all these factors a¤ect the steady-state values of
relevant variables such as residential debt and rental market relative proportion. Then, I study how
these features a¤ect the monetary policy transmission mechanism by showing the dynamics of the model
under di¤erent scenarios. Finally, from a normative perspective, I show how all these structural and
scal factors in the housing markets a¤ect the e¢ ciency and optimal conduct of monetary policy.
Results show that all these factors are able to a¤ect the steady-state proportion of rentals versus
owner-occupied housing, as well as the residential debt-to-GDP ratio. However, in terms of the dy-
namics of the model, taxation is the most signicant feature a¤ecting the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. From a normative perspective, a relatively large rental market makes monetary policy more
stabilizing. However, when the government subsidizes home purchasers, the link between monetary pol-
icy and house prices is weakened and this creates an even more stable scenario. In terms of optimal
monetary policy, when the rental market is relatively large, monetary policy should respond more ag-
gressively to ination and disregard output, because the nancial accelerator e¤ects are weaker in this
case.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 simulates the
model and shows how the steady-state values of debt and rental size are a¤ected when preferences,
taxation, and e¢ ciency vary. Section 4 displays the dynamics of the model through impulse responses.
Section 5 computes policy e¢ ciency frontiers. Section 6 discusses optimal monetary policy. Section 7
concludes.
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2 The Model
Iacoviello (2005) proposed a way to introduce housing markets in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model, which is suitable to study the transmission of monetary policy through the housing market
and analyze welfare. In Iacoviello-type models, there are two types of agents, savers and borrowers.
These consumers di¤er in their discount factors and in the fact that borrowers have collateral con-
straints in order to have access to credit markets. In particular, savers are more patient than borrowers
and the latter need housing collateral to borrow. In this paper, I extend the Iacoviello (2005) framework
to include rental markets to evaluate the implications of housing tenure on monetary policy.2
2.1 Consumers
2.1.1 Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing services,3 and working hours.
Note that the di¤erence between this utility function and the standard one is that housing enters the
utility function as an argument:
maxE0
1X
t=0
ts

logCs;t + j logHs;t   (Ns;t)



;
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator, and Cs;t, Hs;t, and Ns;t
represent consumption at time t, the housing stock, and working hours, respectively. 1= (   1) is the
labor supply elasticity,  > 0; and j > 0 constitutes the relative weight of housing in the utility function.
The budget constraint is:
Cs;t + bs;t + qh;t [(1  h) (Hs;t  Hs;t 1) + (Hz;t  Hz;t 1)]  Rt 1bs;t 1
t
+ws;tNs;t + qz;tHz;t + St   Tt; (1)
where qh;t is the real housing price and ws;t is the saversreal wage. These agents can purchase or sell
housing at the current price qh;t, either to live in the house (Hs;t), or to rent it (Hz;t) : Savers obtain qz;t
for rentals. There exists a subsidy h to home purchasers. As it will be shown, this group of agents will
2The advantage of following this approach is that this model is comparable with the literature on housing and the
nancial accelerator, thus making it easier to interpret the results.
3 It is assumed that housing services are proportional to housing stock.
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choose not to borrow at all, because they are the savers in the economy. Savings are given by bs;t, at
the interest rate Rt 1. t is the ination rate at period t. St are the prots that rms receive. Tt is a
lump-sum government tax.
The rst-order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows.
1
Cs;t
= sEt

Rt
Cs;t+1t+1

(2)
j
Hs;t
= (1  h)

qh;t
Cs;t
  sEt

qt+1
Cs;t+1

(3)
ws;t = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t (4)
qh;t
Cs;t
=
qz;t
Cs;t
+ sEt
qh;t+1
Cs;t+1
(5)
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (3)
represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, benets for consuming
housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (4) is the labor-supply condition. Equation (5)
is the rst-order condition for housing that is purchased to rent.
2.1.2 Borrowers
Borrowers solve the following problem:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tb

logCb;t + j log eHb;t   (Nb;t)


;
where b 2 (0; 1) is the impatient agentsdiscount factor. ~Hb;t is a composite of owner-occupied housing
and rental services, represented by a CES aggregator. !h indicates the preference for owner-occupied
housing and "h is the elasticity of substitution between preferences for owner-occupied housing and rental.
In this way, borrowers derive utility from the two types of housing. Note that this does not literally
mean that each borrower lives simultaneously in their own house and in a rented house. Instead, the
interpretation is that there exists a large representative borrower-type household with a continuum of
members, some of whom live in owner-occupied houses, the rest of whom live in rented houses. This
composite index in the equation thus represents the aggregate preferences of all household members with
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respect to each kind of housing service:4
~Hb;t =
h
!
1="h
h (Hb;t)
("h 1)="h + (1  !h)1="h (Hz;t)("h 1)="h
i"h=("h 1)
; (6)
where Hb;t is the owner-occupied borrowershousing stock and Hz;t are rental services. Subject to the
budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
Cb;t +
Rt 1bb;t 1
t
+ qh;t (1  h) (Hb;t  Hb;t 1) + qz;t (1  z)Hz;t = bb;t + wb;tNb;t; (7)
bb;t  Et

1
Rt
kqt+1Hb;tt+1

; (8)
where bb;t represents borrowings. k can be interpreted as a loan-to-value ratio. The collateral constraints
limit borrowings to the discounted present value of the borrowersowner-occupied housing. Note that
this constraint creates a nancial accelerator e¤ect because loans depend directly on housing values. The
rst-order conditions of this maximization problem are as follows:
1
Cb;t
= bEt

Rt
Cb;t+1t+1

+ t; (9)
j
~Hb;t
 
!h ~Hb;t
Hb;t
!1="h
= (1  h)

qh;t
Cb;t
  bEt qh;t+1
Cb;t+1

  tkEtqh;t+1t+1
Rt
; (10)
wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (11)
j
~Hb;t
 
(1  !h) ~Hb;t
Hz;t
!1="h
= (1  z) qz;t
Cb;t
; (12)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral constraint.5 These rst-order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to those of savers. However, an important di¤erence lies in housing demand,
equation (10). It equates the marginal utility of owner-occupied housing to the e¤ective user cost of
4 In this way, the model is comparable to other Iacoviello-type models in which housing is indivisible and is represented
by a continuum consumed by a representative agent. There are other studies that treat nonconvexities in housing using
non-linear computational techniques [see, for example, Chambers et al. (2009), Nakajima (2010), Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2014), Corbae and Quintin (forthcoming)]. However, in this paper, I follow the Iacoviello-type approach.
5Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the
collateral constraint holds with equality.
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housing minus the marginal value of housing as collateral. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in the
value of the collateral has a positive e¤ect on the owner-occupied housing demand of borrowers.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is perfectly competitive. The homogeneous intermediate good is pro-
duced according to the following technology:
Yt = N

s;tN
(1 )
b;t ; (13)
where Ns;t and Nb;t represent the saversand borrowers labor supply, respectively.6  represents the
labor-income ratio of patient agents. Free entry to the sector implies a zero-prot condition, which
implies the following labor demand for both agents:
ws;t =
1
Xt

Yt
Ns;t
; (14)
wb;t =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Nb;t
; (15)
where Xt is the markup or the inverse of the marginal cost.7
2.2.2 Final Goods Producers
A continuum of monopolistically competitive rms produce nal goods. Prices are set following the
Calvo (1983) mechanism.8 This implies the following log-linear approximation of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve for ination:
log t = sEt log t+1 +
(1  ) (1  s)

logXt; (16)
where  is the probability that rms do not change prices.
6By symmetry, I omit the indices corresponding to each intermediate good.
7The complete derivation of this problem is available upon request.
8Note that the model does not include any price rigidities in the housing market, as most models of this kind. However,
it needs to be said that Barsky et al. (2007) nd that sticky durable prices may have implications for shock transmission.
On the contrary, Jeske and Liu (2013) nd that, although empirically rental prices tend to be sticky, they are not an
important component of optimal monetary policy.
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2.3 Monetary Authority
The central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor rule:
Rt = (Rt 1)
"

(1+)
t

Yt
Yt 1
y
R
#(1 )
"R;t; (17)
where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest rate smoothing.  > 0; y > 0 measure
the interest rate response to ination and output, respectively. R is the steady-state value of the interest
rate. "R;t is a white noise shock with 0 average and 2" variance:
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2.4 Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium condition for the goods markets is:
Yt = Cs;t + Cb;t: (18)
Housing supply is xed and normalized to unity:
Hs;t +Hb;t +Hz;t = 1: (19)
The equilibrium government budget constraint is given by:
Tt = zq
z
tHz;t + hq
h
t [(Hs;t  Hs;t 1) + (Hb;t  Hb;t 1)] : (20)
3 Simulation
3.1 Parameter Values for Benchmark
Table 1 presents a summary of the simulation parameter values.
9 In this model, the ination rate that feeds into the Taylor rule does not take into account the rental rate of housing.
Jeske and Liu (2013) explore this issue in a DSGE model and nd that the optimal weight on rental ination in the Taylor
rule is small.
9
Table 1: Parameter values
s 0:99 Saversdiscount factor
b 0:98 Borrowersdiscount factor
j 0:1 Housing weight in the utility function
   1 1 Inverse of the labor-supply elasticity
k 0:8 Loan-to-value ratio
 0:64 Saverslabor-income share
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 0:75 Probability of not changing prices
"h 2 Elasticity of substitution between owner-occupied and rental
!h 0:5 Preference for owner-occupied housing
h 0:10 Subsidy to house purchases
z 0 Subsidy to rentals
 0:8 Interest rate smoothing
 0:5 Ination coe¢ cient TR
y 0 Output coe¢ cient TR
The model is calibrated for the US economy. The discount factor for savers, s, is set to 0.99
corresponding to an annualized interest rate of 4% in the steady state. The discount factor for borrowers
is set to 0.98.10 The weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1, which implies a GDP-to-
housing wealth ratio of approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with US data.11 The parameter
 takes the value of 2, implying a labor-supply elasticity of 1.12 Concerning the value that proxies the
loan-to-value ratio, k, is set to 0:8; an average for the US and Europe data. To set the value of the
labor-income share of savers to 0.64, I follow Iacoviello (2005) estimates. The steady-state markup takes
the value of 1:2. The probability of rms not changing prices is xed to 0:75, which implies that prices
change on average every four quarters. The value for "h is set to 2, following Ortega et al. (2011).
For the Taylor rule parameters, I use  = 0:8 and  = 0:5, the rst implying a realistic degree of
10Lawrance (1991) estimates discount factors for low-income consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at a quarterly frequency.
I take the most conservative value.
11The parameter j mainly controls the stock of residential housing over annual output, which is 140 percent, in line with
data from the Flow of Funds accounts (See Table B.100 from the US Flow of Funds data). In this model, consumption is
the only component of GDP. To make the ratio comparable with the data I multiply it by 0.6, which is approximately what
nondurable consumption and services account for in the GDP, according to the data in the NIPA tables.
12Microeconomic estimations suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) nd that,
in the presence of credit constraints, these estimated values have a 50% downward bias.
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interest rate smoothing and the second consistent with the initial value proposed by Taylor in 1993.
I set subsidies to purchase and rent to values corresponding to the US economy. In particular, I set
h to 10% to approximate the 10 percent tax credit of the purchase price of a principal residence that
was introduced in the US after the crisis.13 For !h, the preference parameter referring to owning versus
renting, I calibrate it to 0.32 to match the residential debt to GDP ratio and the size of the rental market
in the US, around 70% in the post-crisis period and 37%, respectively.14
3.2 Factors That Inuence the Relative Proportion of Home Purchases versus Rentals
In this section, I analyze how the values of the key parameters that determine housing tenure a¤ect the
steady-state proportion of rentals with respect to property housing15 as well as the residential debt-to-
GDP ratio. In particular, I consider the relative preference of owner-occupied housing versus rental, and
the scal treatment of housing, i.e. subsidies to home purchases or rentals.
As stated in the Introduction, the di¤erent relative weight of rental markets could in part be caused
by di¤erences in household preferences or cultural factors. Then, we could think that German households
simply prefer to rent while Spanish households have developed a preference toward purchasing, which
could be the consequence of cultural factors. In the model that has been presented, this factor would
be included in the parameter !h, which represents the preference for owner-occupied housing in the
utility function. In Table 2, I present the steady states for some representative values of this parameter,
including the US benchmark, for comparison (in bold).
Table 2: Steady-state values for di¤erent !h
!h = 0:2 !h= 0:32 !h = 0:5 !h = 0:8 !h = 0:9
Debt/GDP 0:43 0:69 1:08 1:75 1:97
Rental/Purchase 0:40 0:36 0:29 0:20 0:17
As expected, the model generates a situation in which the higher is the weight of owner-occupied
housing relative to rentals in the borrowers utility function, the larger is the debt ratio in the economy
and the lower is the proportion renting relative to home purchase. The parameter !h reects how
preferences a¤ect the relative weight of the rental sector across countries. Low values of this parameter
13See Dynan et al. (2013) for further details.
14Data can be found in the European Mortgage Federation (EMF) and the National Multifamily Housing Council
(NMHC).
15This ratio has been calculated as Hz/H.
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imply that owner-occupied housing has less weight in the utility function for borrowers; thus, the model
generates a low residential debt-to-GDP ratio, because agents do not as frequently borrow to purchase
housing, they prefer to substitute purchase with rentals. As a consequence, the proportion of rentals
relative to purchases is larger. This parameter has a powerful e¤ect on the rental share in the market,
however, alone, it cannot explain the whole cross-country di¤erences. For instance, an extremely low
proportion of rentals in a country like Spain could be explain with a value of !h close to 0.9 or higher,
which is unrealistically large. The German high rental share could not be explained with preference
parameters only. In light of these results, there should be other reasons, complementary to preferences,
to fully explain these cross-country di¤erences.
Tax incentives are also a crucial factor in the housing sector. The housing market is a target for
economic policy. In particular, there are many scal exemptions and subsidies for investments and
activities related to housing [see, for example, ECB (2003)]. Taxes and subsidies directly a¤ect the
decision taking of agents in housing matters. In particular, taxation a¤ects the choice between housing
investment and investment in other assets, the choice between new and secondhand housing, and the
choice between purchase or renting a house. In Tables 3 and 4, we can also see a numerical summary of
the results.
Table 3: Steady-state values for di¤erent h
h = 0 h= 0:10 h = 0:15 h = 0:25
Debt/GDP 0:51 0:69 0:83 1:23
Rental/Purchase 0:40 0:36 0:33 0:29
Table 4: Steady-state values for di¤erent z
z= 0 z = 0:15 z = 0:25
Debt/GDP 0:69 0:62 0:56
Rental/Purchase 0:36 0:41 0:45
These tables show how the residential debt values and the proportion of rentals versus purchases
change when a subsidy to home purchases is introduced. As would be expected, when the subsidy
increases, the debt ratio also increases because agents borrow more to nance their housing. However,
the rental proportion decreases because rentals are the substitute for home purchases, which increase
with the subsidy.
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If, on the contrary, there is a subsidy for rentals, we can see the opposite e¤ects. When rentals are
encouraged, the residential debt-to-GDP ratio decreases and the relative proportion of rentals in the
economy increases.
Again, this factor alone could not explain the polar cases in Europe. However, as can be seen, a
combination of strong preferences for owner-occupied housing and favorable taxation towards owning
can be the cause of the low rental share in a country such as Spain, or some Eastern European countries.
Analogously, a combination of preferences for renting and favorable taxation towards renting could be
behind the high rental share in a country such as Germany.
4 Model Dynamics
In this section, I present impulse responses to an increase in the interest rate corresponding to one
standard deviation (0.29 percent).16 First, I display the benchmark case, corresponding to the US para-
meterization shown above. Then, I compare di¤erent situations in which alternative parameterizations
imply high and low rental shares.17
4.1 Benchmark
Figure 1 shows impulse responses for the benchmark case, in which there is an equal preference for rented
and owner-occupied housing in the borrowersutility function and there are no subsidies.
This restrictive monetary policy action, shown in Figure 1, reduces as expected economic activity and
ination. Real housing prices move inversely with the interest rate, as does any asset price. On the other
hand, the increase in housing nancing cost makes borrowers reduce their housing stock with mortgages
and substitute them for rented houses. Furthermore, this e¤ect is reinforced rst by an initial fall in
housing prices, which reduces the value of owner-occupied housing as a collateral, and second by the fall
in the rental price. The rental price falls because owners expect a rapid recovery in real housing prices.18
The fall in the rental price produces an increase in rented houses. Both borrowers and savers reduce their
consumption. Savers, given the interest rate increase, smooth their consumption and intertemporally
16 Iacoviello (2005) estimates a Taylor rule for the US and nds a value of 0.29 percent at a quarterly frequency. I use
this value as an empirically plausible one.
17For simplicity, in the model, the government is assumed to pay lump-sum transfers to saver households, but not to
borrower households. Results in the paper are not driven by this assumption. To check that, I have run the model assuming
the extreme case where all transfers are given to borrowers, and found that the model dynamics are essentially unchanged.
18This e¤ect can be observed rewriting equation (5) as qz;tAz = qh;t   sEt

Cs;t
Cs;t+1

qh;t+1: Rental prices move directly
with current house prices but inversely with expected future house prices.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Benchmark
substitute, consuming less in the present to be able to consume in the future. Borrowers, however, su¤er
a negative e¤ect on their consumption due to their collateral constraint: the fall in housing prices and
in housing demand reduces the collateral value for mortgages and causes a larger fall in consumption.
This decrease in consumption implies a reduction in economic activity and ination.
Impulse responses coming from the theoretical model are in line with the empirical evidence. For
instance, Iacoviello (2005) estimate a VAR for the US economy including housing variable. This study
nds that house prices move inversely with the interest rate, because they are an asset price. Towbin
and Weber (2015) extend the VAR to include variables related to rental markets. They perform a similar
experiment considering a mortgage interest rate shock. They nd that a decrease in the mortgage rate
(which would be equivalent to an expansionary monetary policy shock), drives the house price up, the
rent-to-price ratio down, and the vacancy rate up. That would be the mirror image of the theoretical
experiment I run with my model.
However, the dynamics of the model may change with the parameters a¤ecting housing tenure.
Responses in the markets for mortgage or rented houses are going to be more or less sensitive to changes
in monetary policy depending on preferences, institutions, and taxation, and this may be transmitted
to the real economy. The following subsections display those cases.
4.2 Preferences and the E¢ ciency of Institutions
Figure 2 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for the benchmark and two di¤erent
parameterizations. The solid line corresponds to the US calibration. The marked line to a situation
in which consumers have a high preference for owner-occupied housing (!h = 0:8). The dashed line
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. High versus low preference for owner-occupied
housing and benchmark
represents consumers preferring rented houses more strongly (!h = 0:2).
Given an increase in interest rates and the consequent fall in house prices, mortgaged houses fall in
all cases. However, when the preference for owner-occupied housing is lower, mortgaged houses decrease
more strongly because they have less value in terms of utility for consumers. This sharper decrease in
mortgaged houses, in the case of low preference for owner-occupied housing, produces a stronger fall in
the collateral held by borrowers. Then, in this case, borrowerswealth decreases more, and by way of
compensation, rented houses fall. In the case in which consumers have a preference for owner-occupied
housing in the utility function, wealth does not decrease as much and, given the fall in rental rates,
rented houses increase. When consumerspreference for rented houses is stronger, even though rental
rates also fall, the decrease in wealth makes them cut rented houses for the level of consumption to not
fall dramatically (notice that consumption has a stronger weight in the utility function than housing).
As a result, given that borrowers readjust their rentals, at the aggregate level, there is no substantial
di¤erence between the two scenarios. Di¤erent preferences in housing tenure produce a redistribution
between rented and purchased houses but the aggregate economy is only slightly a¤ected.
However, even if preferences and institutional e¢ ciency generate di¤erences in housing markets, the
implications for the overall economy are not so large. We will see that taxation is able to produce more
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a technology shock. High versus low preference for owner-occupied
housing and benchmark
remarkable di¤erences in output, ination, and house prices.
For the sake of completeness, I repeat the experiment for a technology shock. Figure 3 shows that the
technology sock, accompanied by a decrease in the interest rate, is expansionary for the owner-occupied
housing market, especially when there is a strong preference for this types of houses, as expected.
Therefore, consumers substitute rented houses by mortgaged houses and this e¤ect is stronger the larger
the preference parameter is.
4.3 Tax incentives
Figure 4 displays impulse responses to a monetary policy shock given di¤erent scal treatment for
housing. In particular, the solid line represents the benchmark. The dashed line is case in which
owner-occupied housing is subsidized to 25%. The marked line is the case in which rented houses are
subsidized.
When a subsidy to owner-occupied housing is introduced, this a¤ects both borrowers and savers.
Real housing prices are lower, in e¤ective terms, for both groups. When there is a positive monetary
policy shock, borrowers substitute away from rented houses for mortgaged houses. This strong increase
in mortgaged houses greatly increases debt repayments and borrowers have to reduce their consumption
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Favorable scal treatment to owner-occupied
housing versus rentals and benchmark
to meet their debt obligations. Following this e¤ect, output and ination fall strongly. The interest rate
reacts to the fall in ination and starts to decrease. The fall in the interest rate makes savers increase
consumption following their Euler equation. Saving decreases as a result and, for credit markets to clear,
borrowing also decreases. This e¤ect makes consumption by borrowers decrease even further.
When instead rentals are subsidized, the increase in the interest rate makes borrowers substitute
away in the opposite direction, that is, buy more rented houses. The fall in house prices, the increase
in the interest rate, and the favorable tax treatment for rented houses decrease mortgaged houses. This
produces a fall in the value of the collateral for borrowers, which in turn decreases consumption by
borrowers. The increase in interest rates reduces saversconsumption. These two e¤ects together reduce
economic activity and ination.
Results show that di¤erent tax treatments have an e¤ect on how monetary policy transmits to the
real economy. In this case, it is not a mere redistribution between rented and purchased homes but it
also a¤ects consumption, output, and ination di¤erently depending on the subsidy that is applied.
Figure 5 shows impulse responses for a technology shock for the same three cases. Here, we see that
the subsidy on houses produces an income e¤ect on borrowers and this causes the shock to be more
expansionary in this case. This make the interest rate not to react as much in this case.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a technology shock. Favorable scal treatment to owner-occupied housing
versus rentals and benchmark
5 Policy Frontiers
To examine the implications of these structural and scal factors in housing markets for the e¢ ciency
of monetary policy, I compute policy frontiers. These frontiers, also known as Taylor curves, display the
trade-o¤ that central banks face when trying to stabilize output and ination.19 A curve that is closer
to the origin represents a situation in which monetary policy is more e¢ cient in the sense of stabilizing
ination and output at the same time.20
Figure 6 displays the Taylor curve for two di¤erent values of the parameter that dictates the preference
for owner-occupied versus rented houses. The solid line represents a situation in which owner-occupied
houses are preferred to rented ones. The dashed line represents the opposite case. These two cases
correspond to the two situations presented in the previous section, with impulse responses. The point
corresponding to the benchmark calibration is also presented (red triangle). We can see from the gure
that monetary policy is more e¢ cient when consumers prefer rented houses. Given the same change in
the interest rate, when borrowers prefer rented houses, changes in house prices do not a¤ect the real
19Here, it is assumed that the policy maker aims at minimizing these variances but without making any assumptions
about the loss function.
20 I compute the Taylor curves as the minimum values of ination and output variance for di¤erent values of the policy
rule parameters. To generate the trade-o¤, I consider cost-push shocks with a 0.02 standard error, corresponding to the
estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Ination is measured on a quarterly basis.
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Figure 6: Policy frontier. High versus low preference for owner-occupied housing and actual point
(benchmark)
economy as much, providing a more stable scenario. Collateral e¤ects may exacerbate the trade-o¤
between output and ination variability, so that an environment in which these e¤ects are softened by
preferences may deliver more economic stability.
As for the dynamics of the model, the e¢ ciency of the institutions and the preference factor deliver
similar results. In both cases, the scenario in which the rental market share is larger provides a more
stable situation. A similar argument applies here. In a situation in which it is easier to derive housing
services from rentals, borrowers substitute mortgaged housing by rentals. Therefore, changes in house
prices coming from monetary policy do not produce destabilizing collateral e¤ects.
Figure 7 displays the case in which scal treatment favours either owning or renting. The benchmark
calibration point is also displayed. In one situation, subsidies are given to home purchasers whereas in
the other subsidies benet rentals. We see that, in this case, monetary policy is more e¢ cient when
home purchase is subsidized. On the one hand, subsidizing rentals makes the economy less dependent
on housing price movements, as in the previous case. However, subsidizing home purchases means that
changes in house prices are e¤ectively smaller because the subsidy represents a reduction in the real
housing price, for both types of consumers. Then, a change in real house prices coming from a change
in monetary policy a¤ects the economy less and therefore increases stability.
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point (benchmark)
6 Optimal Monetary Policy
So far, we have seen that, for a given monetary policy, a change in the interest rate is transmitted dif-
ferently depending on the structural parameters that a¤ect rental and owner-occupied housing markets.
Furthermore, the e¢ ciency of monetary policy is also a¤ected by these structural and scal factors. In
this section, we study the optimality of monetary policy for each case. I restrict the analysis to simple,
linear rules in which interest rates respond to output and ination. In particular, for each situation, I
search for the combination of reaction parameters in the Taylor rule (both for output and ination) that
maximizes total welfare.
As a measure of welfare, I solve the model using a second-order approximation to the structural
equations for given policy and then evaluate welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori
(2007), I take this latter approach to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately.21 The
welfare of the individual for savers and borrowers, respectively, follows:
Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (21)
21 I used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluated welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j log eHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)


: (22)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I dene social welfare as a weighted sum of the welfare of
individuals for the di¤erent types of households:
Wt = (1  s)Ws;t + (1  b)Wb;t: (23)
Each agents welfare is weighted by his/her discount factor, respectively, so that all groups receive the
same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.22
Table 5 presents the values for the Taylor rule parameters that maximize welfare, as dened above.
Table 5: Optimal values for Taylor rule parameters
(1 + ) y
Low rental share ('10%)
!h = 0:8 1:1 0:005
h = 0:25 1:11 0
High rental share ('30%)
!h = 0:2 1:19 0
z = 0:25 1:19 0
We see that for cases in which the rental share is high, because the collateral e¤ect is less strong, it
is optimal to respond more aggressively against ination but the output response is negligible. For the
case in which !h = 0:8, corresponding to a low rental share, it is optimal to slightly increase the response
of the interest rate to output. Because the collateral e¤ects in this case are stronger, it is optimal to
cut these e¤ects by responding to output more strongly. The case in which h = 0:25 is a special one
because even though the rental share in this case is low, and this should increase the collateral e¤ects,
the economys exposure to changes in house prices is softened by the subsidy, which in this case applies
to both agents, making monetary policy more e¢ cient. Therefore, monetary policy does not need to be
as aggressive either for ination or for output to stabilize the economy.
22 In models with collateral constraints, it is di¢ cult to construct analytically Woodford type loss and welfare functions,
because of the presence of borrowers and savers. A solution that it is typically used in the literature is to use individual
utility functions and numerically compute welfare, using some sort of aggregation.
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7 Conclusions
Rental markets present clear di¤erences across countries in terms of size, e¢ ciency, and dynamism. This
heterogeneity responds to di¤erent factors: consumer preferences, scal treatment of housing purchase
versus rental, the institutional framework, or the development of the nancial market, among others.
I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that captures all these issues. It features
a housing market, both rented and owner-occupied. Borrowers face credit constraints and use their
purchased housing as collateral. I then use the model to study how these characteristics a¤ect monetary
policy.
This setting is able to reect the basic points that determine the di¤erences between the rental
markets across countries. It also recovers a fundamental concept in housing markets, namely nancial
accelerator e¤ects derived from collateral constraints. Therefore, it is a valid framework for comparative
analysis of di¤erent economic policies to modify the relative weight of home purchases versus rentals.
The model generates impulse responses that are in line with economic theory and empirical evidence,
in which an increase in the interest rate contracts the economy and decreases owner-occupied housing
in favor of rentals. Within this theoretical framework, the preference or cultural factor that a¤ects the
proportion of rentals with respect to purchases is reected by the parameter associated with the weight
of home purchases in the utility function. The model generates a steady state in which the higher this
parameter is, the more agents are indebted and the less they rent. The scal treatment of the housing
market is reected by a subsidy to home purchasers and a subsidy to rentals. The subsidy to purchasers
decreases the proportion of rentals while debt increases. The subsidy to rentals has the opposite e¤ect.
I present impulse responses to a monetary policy and a technology shock under the di¤erent structural
settings. Simulations show that shocks are transmitted in a di¤erent way through the housing market
depending on the relative size of rentals versus owner occupation. These structural and scal di¤erences
also have implications for the e¢ ciency of monetary policy. Results show that when the relative size of
the rental market is larger, monetary policy is more stabilizing than in the benchmark scenario. However,
when the government subsidizes home purchasers, the link between monetary policy and house prices is
weaker and this creates an even more stable scenario. An optimal monetary policy analysis suggests that
when the relative size of the rental market is large, monetary policy should respond more aggressively
to ination and disregard output, because the nancial accelerator e¤ects are weaker in this case.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Tenure structure across countries. Percent of dwelling stock (2009). Source: OECD
Figure A2: Tenant-landlord regulations in the private rental market (2009). Scale 0-6 increasing in
protection for tenants. Source: OECD
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Figure A3: Tax relief on debt nancing cost of home ownership (2009). Source: OECD
Justice is slow is not a¤ordable does not enforce decisions is a great obstacle
[OLE6] France 47,0% 16,3% 2,1% 4,1%
Germany 20,6% 18,6% 4,2% 8,0%
Italy 62,4% 43,8% 8,9% 16,3%
Spain 41,2% 13,5% 4,2% 12,2%
UK 17,3% 18,2% 1,0% 2,0%
US 23,2% 25,3% 7,1% 2,2%
Table A1: Enforcement contracts indicators (World Business Environment). Source: Mora-Sanguinetti
(2011)
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